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Abstract
This paper uses a two-sided market model of hospital competition to study the im-
plications of di¤erent remunerations schemes on the physicians side. The two-sided
market approach is characterized by the concept of common network externality (CNE)
introduced by Bardey et al. (2010). This type of externality occurs when occurs when
both sides value, possibly with di¤erent intensities, the same network externality. We
explicitly introduce e¤ort exerted by doctors. By increasing the number of medical acts
(which involves a costly e¤ort) the doctor can increase the quality of service o¤ered to
patients (over and above the level implied by the CNE). We rst consider pure salary,
capitation or fee-for-service schemes. Then, we study schemes that mix fee-for-service
with either salary or capitation payments. We show that salary schemes (either pure
or in combination with fee-for-service) are more patient friendly than (pure or mixed)
capitations schemes. This comparison is exactly reversed on the providersside. Quite
surprisingly, patients always loose when a fee-for-service scheme is introduced (pure
of mixed). This is true even though the fee-for-service is the only way to induce the
providers to exert e¤ort and it holds whatever the patientsvaluation of this e¤ort. In
other words, the increase in quality brought about by the fee-for-service is more than
compensated by the increase in fees faced by patients.
Jel codes: D42, L11, L12.
Keywords: Two-Sided markets, Common Network Externality, Providers remu-
neration schemes.
1 Introduction
Health care system in developed countries face a number of challenges. First, there is
the achievement or consolidation of universal access. Second, there is a strong concern
about the level of health care quality delivered to patients. Third, the increasing health
care costs observed in most countries defy the sustainability of health care systems.
Consequently, cost control has become a prominent issue. In this paper we deal with
the last two issues which, as eloquently pointed out in Newhouse (1996), are often in
conict.
This potential trade-o¤ between quality and cost control has been widely examined
in the literature. On one hand, many papers compare the incentives generated by di¤er-
ent remuneration schemes for providers. More precisely, it is studied how remuneration
schemes a¤ect providersoutput, typically measured by health care quality and by the
number of patient consultations (Devlin and Sarma, 2010). It is usually recognized that
providers are encouraged to provide more services under a fee-for-service scheme, than
under other remuneration schemes, such as capitation payment or salary1. On the other
hand, in order to lower the health care costs and to encourage health care quality, dif-
ferent countries have experimented ongoing reforms that stimulate competition (Brekke
et al., 2009). Several authors have tried to assess the impact of competition on health
care quality. While theoretical studies usually predict a positive impact of competition
on health care quality, the empirical literature leads to more mitigated results.2
From a methodological perspective, the rst strand of literature analyzes remu-
neration schemes within a principal-agent framework, while the second uses imperfect
competition models to examine the relationship between of competition and health care
quality.3 Right now, there exists a gap between these two approaches and the interplay
1See for instance Carlsen and Grytten (2010).
2See for instance Ma and Burgess (1993), Gravelle (1999) and Brekke, Nuscheler and Straume (2007).
The empirical literature is surveyed by Gaynor (2006).
3Empirical studies of remuneration schemes usually take into account some selection e¤ects. In
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between competition on the one hand, and the incentive properties of remuneration
schemes on the other hand does not appear to be well understood. In this paper, we
use a two-sided market approach in order to bridge this gap, at least in part4. More
precisely, we consider a duopoly situation between two for-prot hospitals where the
competition is twofold. On one side, hospitals compete to attract patients; on the other
side, to a¢ liate doctors. Patients are sensitive to price, to the number of consultations
and to the health care quality delivered by hospitals. Doctors are also sensitive to the
quality delivered to patients, in a general way, to the nancial transfer paid by hospi-
tals and more specically to the number of consultation when hospitals use, at least
partially, a fee-for-service scheme.5
Our two-sided approach is based on the concept of common network externality
(CNE) introduced by Bardey et al. (2010). It is used to represent the health care
quality delivered by a hospital and a¤ect utility of both patients and doctors. It is
a well established fact that the quality of health care delivered in hospitals depends
on the doctors workload. This is documented, for instance, by Tarnow-Mordi et
al. (2000) who use UK data to show that variations in mortality can be explained
in part by excess workload in the intensive care unit. Accordingly, health care quality
is frequently related to the doctor/provider ratio; see Mc Gillis Hall (2004). In other
words, it increases when the number of health care professionals increases (for a given
number of patients), but decreases when the number of patients increases (for a given
number of providers). In this paper, we adopt a quite general expression for the quality
provided by hospitals. We continue to assume that quality always increases in the
number of doctors. However, no assumption about the patients impact on the CNE
particular, they study how providers select the health care organization they work for according to the
remuneration schemes they adopt.
4 In fact, Ma and Riordan (2003) consider a competitive environment and analyze providersremu-
neration schemes. The di¤erence with our paper is that they do not have network externalities that
reinforce the interplay between competition and incentives.
5 In reality many hospitals are not for prot. It would be interesting to extend our analysis to mixed
oligopoly (see Conclusion).
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is needed. We do not rule out the possibility that it can also increases in the number
of patients for low values because of a learning-by-doing e¤ect. For larger patients
numbers, on the other hand, the congestion e¤ect can be expected to dominate (and
we return to the negative relationship between number of patients and quality). In all
cases, both sides benet from a higher quality albeit for di¤erent reasons and possibly
with di¤erent intensity. This is quite obvious on the patientsside, where one can expect
a higher quality to translate into a improvement in patientshealth state (or at the very
least into a reduction in waiting lines for appointments, etc...). Physicians benet from
a higher quality through a reduction in their workload,6 or indirectly, through their
altruism (or simply job satisfaction).7 This quality index can also be interpreted as a
proxy that indicates how binding is the time constraint of the providers who work for an
hospital. Consequently, it can be viewed as a determinant of the consultation duration
received by patients.
We depart from the setting of Bardey et al. (2010) by introducing e¤ort exerted by
doctors. Specically, this e¤ort is measured by the number of additional consultations.
The idea is that by increasing the number of medical acts (which involves a costly e¤ort)
the doctor can increase the quality of service o¤ered to patients (over and above the
level implied by the CNE). More precisely, as doctors must receive a given number of
patients in a certain time interval, they can increase the time devoted to each patient
by increasing the number of consultation in their extra-time.8
The general remuneration scheme we dene includes a salary, a capitation payment
and a fee-for-service component. On the patientsside, we concentrate on the case with
a xed fee. In a rst step, we consider pure payment schemes. Not surprisingly, we
nd that the number of consultation is higher under a fee-for-service scheme than under
6See for instance Fergusson-Paré (2004) for the nursing workload. Gri¢ n and Swan (2006) also nd
a strong relationship between nursesworkload and quality of health care.
7See, Liu and Ma (2010).
8Additional consultations play essentially the role of endogenous labor supply in our model.
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other schemes. As a matter of fact, when providers are remunerated solely via a salary
or a capitation payment, they provide the minimum level of e¤ort. Under salary and
capitation schemes, hospitals obtain the same prot at equilibrium. Patients pay a lower
price and providers are less remunerated when providers receive capitation payments
rather than salary schemes. In other words, a capitation payment scheme favor patients
while providers are better o¤ under a salary scheme. Next, in spite of the fact that
patients value positively the number of consultations, our results suggest that patients
are worse o¤ when providers are paid via a fee-for-service rather than under a salary
scheme. We show this analytically for the case when the number of acts provides only
small benets to patients. For larger levels of benets, numerical simulations appear to
corroborate this result. Surprisingly, we nd that hospitalsprot may be higher when
providers are remunerated via a fee-for-service scheme rather than under a capitation
payment or salary.
Second, we consider payment schemes mixing fee-for-service with either salary or
capitation payments. We show that in both cases, hospitals set the fee-for-service rate
just equal to the patientsvaluation of doctorse¤ort. Consequently, an e¢ cient level
of e¤ort is achieved and total welfare is maximum. Nevertheless, the introduction of a
fee-for-service along with either a wage or a capitation scheme always reduces patients
welfare, while doctorswelfare is enhanced. Exactly like in the pure remuneration case,
the presence of a capitation element favors patients, while a salary term favors doctors.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the set-up. Section 3 provides
equilibrium conditions under general payment schemes. Pure salary and capitation
schemes are considered in Section 4, while a pure fee-for-service system on the providers
side is studied in Section 5. Finally, mixed schemes are considered in Section 6.
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2 The model
Consider two hospitals j = f1; 2g located at both endpoints of the Hotellings line. They
compete for patients (group P of mass 1) on one side and for physicians or doctors
(group D of mass m) on the other side.9 Both groups are uniformly distributed over an
interval of length 1. The utilities of both groups exhibit quadratic transportation costs
with parameters tP and tD respectively.10
Let nij denote the share of type i = P;D individuals a¢ liated with hospital j = 1; 2,
while N ij denotes the number of a¢ liates. With our normalizations, we have N
P
j = n
P
j
and NDj = mn
D
j . The two-sided market representation we adopt is based on the concept
of common network externalitywith the following denition:
Denition 1 (Bardey et al., 2010) A common network externality, described by the
function qj = '(NPj ; N
D
j ); occurs when both sides value, possibly with di¤erent intensi-
ties, the same network externality.
This network externality is one of the determinants of the quality o¤ered by a hos-
pital. An important feature of this denition is that the functional form ' is the same
on both sides (for instance qj can represent simply the patient/doctor ratio). In other
words, patients and doctors agree on the ranking of quality levels but they may di¤er in
the intensity of preferences. We assume @'=@NDi > 0 so that quality increases with the
number of doctors. Even though doctor/patient ratio illustration is useful for the sake
of interpretation, we consider a more general assumption concerning how the number of
patients a¤ect the quality. Indeed, we assume @'=@NPi < 0 for su¢ ciently large levels
of and NPi , but @'=@N
P
i > 0 is not ruled out for small patient numbers. These as-
sumptions on qj allow us to capture that for su¢ ciently large patient numbers quality is
9We shall refer to members of group D indistinctively as (health care) providers, physicians or
doctors.
10None of our results would change if transportation costs were linear rather than quadratic.
5
negatively related to the doctorsworkload, while for small it may be positively related
to patient numbers because of a learning-by-doing e¤ect.11
The utility of a patient, located at z, who patronizes hospital j and faces a total bill
of Kj (a xed fee) is given by
V = V +Qj  Kj   tP (z   xj)2 ; (1)
where V is a constant, while Qj is a quality index.12 This quality index consists of two
elements. The rst one is the common network externality which, as explained above,
depends on the relative number of patients and providers a¢ liated to this hospital. We
can think about this term as representing the intrinsic quality o¤ered by hospital j.
The second element depends on the physicians e¤ort which, for simplicity, is measured
by the number of medical acts consumed by each patient. Formally, we have
Qj = qj + ej ;
where  and  represent preference intensities for intrinsic quality qj and for the number
of medical acts measured by the e¤ort variable ej . This congestion e¤ect can be
understood by taking into account the doctors time constraint. In a given length of
time, a doctor has to see a certain number of patients; this determines the duration of
the visit, proxy of the quality qj provided by hospital j. However, this congestion e¤ect
is reduced when the physician increases the number of visits, which in turn requires extra
e¤ort (longer working hours). This e¤ect is captured by the variable ej . Observe that,
qj and ej are substitutes. In other words, a low level of quality qj can be compensated by
a higher number of medical acts. The value taken of  may di¤er according to the type
of disease that is considered. For all non chronic diseases, we can expect  to be close to
0. Roughly speaking, for diseases which do not require a special attention from doctors,
11The characterization of the various equilibria we study does not depend on the sign of @'=@NPi .
12As most of patients may benet from an health insurance plan, the price Pj can be interpreted as
the patients out-of-pocket payment to hospital j. Our analysis remains valid under this interpretation
as long as there is not too much heterogeneity in health insurance coverage among patients.
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patients prefer to benet from a longer consultation than to have the same duration of
consultation split into shorter meetings. On the contrary, for chronic diseases, patients
may prefer to benet from the same duration spread over several consultations.
The utility of a physician, located at y, and working for hospital j is given by
U = U + qj + Tj   tD (y   xj)2  	(Ej); (2)
where U is a constant,  is the preference for quality qj , while Tj denotes the remuner-
ation paid by hospital j to its providers. The term 	(Ej) corresponds to the disutility
of e¤ort. For simplicity, we assume a quadratic disutility of e¤ort throughout the paper
so that 	(Ej) = E2j =2. A doctors total e¤ort Ej is given by his e¤ort per patient ej
times the number of patients. The parameters V and U are assumed to be su¢ ciently
large to ensure full coverage on both sides of the market.
The total remuneration of a physicians working for hospital j, treating nPj =(mn
D
j )
patients and realizing an e¤ort ej per patient (and a total e¤ort Ej = nPj =(mn
D
j )ej) is
given by
Tj = wj + dj
nPj
mnDj
+
cjn
P
j
mnDj
ej ;
In words, it may include a xed salary wj  0, a capitation payment dj  0 and a
fee-for-service rate cj  0.
The strategic players in our setting are the hospitals which simultaneously choose
their price structures (Kj ; Tj (wj ; dj ; cj)). These prices induce an patient-doctor alloca-
tion such that each patient and doctor joins his preferred hospital, and with the doctors
e¤ort, ej , chosen according to
ej 2 argmax
cjn
P
j
mnDj
ej  	(
nPj
mnDj
ej);
which (using the quadratic specication of 	) yields
ej =
mnDj
nPj
cj : (3)
7
Not surprisingly, ej increases with the fee-for-service rate cj which is in line with the
supply induced demand literature.13 Furthermore, cj = 0 implies ej = 0. E¤ort is
costly, but does not give any direct benets to providers. Consequently, a positive
e¤ort level can only be achieved through nancial incentives.14 It is worth noticing that
our set-up is somewhat biased towards fee-for-service remuneration scheme (at least as
long as  > 0). This is because, additional consultations contribute positively to the
total quality perceived by patients and it is necessary to have a strictly positive fee-
for-service rate to ensure additional consultations. It is important to keep this in mind
when interpreting our results obtained later on. In particular, we show that, in spite of
this optimistic view of the fee-for-service remuneration, the introduction (or addition)
of a fee-for-service element always makes patients worse of in a two-sided competition
setting.
As both sides are fully covered, demand levels are equivalent to market shares.
Dening the quality di¤erential between hospitals as
g
 
nP1 ;mn
D
1

= '
 
nP1 ;mn
D
1
  '  1  nP1 ;m(1  nD1 ) = q1   q2;
in our Hotellings set-up, the demand functions are
nP1 =
1
2
+
1
2tP

g
 
nP1 ;mn
D
1

+  (e1   e2)  (K1  K2)

;
nD1 =
1
2
+
1
2tD

g
 
nP1 ;mn
D
1

+ w1   w2 + d1 n
P
1
mnD1
  d2 (1  n
P
1 )
m(1  nD1 )
+

c1n
P
1
mnD1
e1  	

nP1
mnD1
e1

 

c2(1  nP1 )
m(1  nD1 )
e2  	

nP1
mnD1
e2

:
13More precisely, the supply induced demand theory states that physicians benet from asymmetric
information (derived from their diagnosis). Consequently, they can select the number of medical acts
provided in order to maximize their own utility. In that context, the number of acts increases with
the fee-for-service rate when the price e¤et dominates the income e¤ect. This is the case in our setting
because with quasilinear preferences the income e¤ect is zero.
14Doctors are also sensitive to health care quality delivered to patients through the CNEs component
(for altruistic or workload related reasons). However, this e¤ect does not give any incentives to provide
e¤ort.
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Using (3) to substitute for the e¤ort levels chosen by the providers yields
nP1 =
1
2
+
1
2tP
(
g
 
nP1 ;mn
D
1

+ 
 
c1
mnD1
nP1
  c2
m
 
1  nD1

1  nP1
!
  (K1  K2)g ; (4)
nD1 =
1
2
+
1
2tD

g
 
nP1 ;mn
D
1

+ w1   w2
+ d1
nP1
mnD1
  d2 (1  n
P
1 )
m(1  nD1 )
+
1
2
h
(c1)
2   (c2)2
i
: (5)
The derivatives of these demand functions with respect to the parameters of the pricing
functions, namely Kj on the patientsside and wj ; dj and cj are stated in Appendix
A. There and in the remainder of the paper subscripts are used for the derivatives of
g, which are denoted gP and gD. The expressions provided in the Appendix imply that
dnP1
dd1
=
1
m
dnP1
dw1
;
dnD1
dd1
=
1
m
dnD1
dw1
: (6)
In words, equation (6) states that salary and capitation fee a¤ect demand behavior on
both sides in a similar way; the respective derivatives are simply proportional to each
other (according to their relative mass).
3 Equilibrium: general expressions
Our main objective is to compare the implications of di¤erent remuneration and pricing
schemes. To do so, we shall successively consider the di¤erent instruments in isolation
or in various combinations. To avoid repetitions, we shall start by considering the
general problem obtained when all instruments are available. Though somewhat lengthy
and tedious the expressions so obtained are convenient to generate the special cases
considered in the remainder of the paper.
Hospital j maximizes its prot functions with respect to Kj ; cj ; dj and wj . With-
out loss of generality, we concentrate on the program of hospital 1 which consists in
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maximizing 1 with respect to K1 and T1 where prot is dened by15
1 = n
P
1 (K1;K2; T1; T2; ) (K1   d1   c1e1) mw1nD1 (K1;K2; T1; T2; ) ;
= nP1 (K1;K2; T1; T2; ) [K1   d1] mnD1 (K1;K2; T1; T2; )

c21 + w1

: (7)
Di¤erentiating with respect to the pricing parameters and setting nP1 = n
D
1 = 1=2
in the resulting expressions shows that the following conditions hold in a symmetric
equilibrium.
@1
@K1
=
1
2
+
@nP1
@K1
[K1   d1] m@n
D
1
@K1

c21 + w1

= 0; (8)
@1
@w1
= [K1   d1] @n
P
1
@w1
  m
2
 m@n
D
1
@w1

c21 + w1

= 0; (9)
@1
@c1
=
@nP1
@c1
[K1   d1] m

c21 + w1
 @nD1
@c1
  2c1m
2
= 0; (10)
@1
@d1
=  1
2
+
dnP1
dd1
[K1   d1] 

c21 + w1

m
dnD1
dd1
= 0: (11)
Not surprisingly, it follows from (6) that
@1
@d1
=
1
m
@1
@w1
:
Consequently, if hospitals use simultaneously capitation payment and salary to remuner-
ate doctors, we have a continuum of symmetric equilibria. This issue has been discussed
in Bardey et al. (2010).16 In this paper, we refrain from dealing with the complexity of
equilibria multiplicity. Instead, we concentrate on studying the equilibrium allocations
obtained under di¤erent type of providersremuneration schemes. Our main focus will
be on schemes that involve a fee-for-service, possibly in combination with capitation
of salary payments. In a rst step, we will report the equilibria under (pure) wage or
15 It is worth noticing that even if we would have a regulated price on patientsside, as it can be the
case in several health care systems, it does not change the two-sided mechanism competition at work in
our model. Indeed, even though we would have a regulated price on patientsside, the patientsdemand
would still depend on transfers paid to doctors, maintaining the two-sided mechanism.
16This result also appears in Armstrong (2006) when platforms use two-part tari¤s.
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capitation scheme which constitute interesting benchmarks. Observe that when there
is no fee-for-service (c = 0) we have e = 0 and we return essentially to the setting of
Bardey et al. (2010) who do already characterize the equilibria under wage and capita-
tion schemes. To make this paper self-contained, we shall restate the main results we
need for the purpose of comparison. We shall refrain from repeating the proofs as well
as the discussion and intuition except when they are directly relevant for our analysis.
4 Pure salary and capitation schemes
Assume rst that the hospitals use a salary scheme for providers, combined with a xed
payment for patients.17 The symmetric equilibrium is then obtained by solving (8) and
(9) after setting c = 0 and using the expressions for the demand derivatives provided in
Appendix A. It is described in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Bardey et al., 2010)When hospitals use Kj and wj as sole instruments
the symmetric equilibrium is given by
Kw1 = tP  
1
2
( +m) gP ; (12)
ww1 =  tD +
1
2
( +m) gD; (13)
and hospitals realize a prot of
w =
mtD + tP
2
  ( + m) (gP +mgD)
4
: (14)
Observe that gP and gD are evaluated at nP1 = n
D
1 = 1=2, so that this proposition
provides a closed form solution.
Turning to the case where hospitals use Kj and dj , solving (8) and (11) establishes
the following proposition.
17Recall that with c = e = 0, a fee-for-service on the patientsside is of no relevance.
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Proposition 2 (Bardey et al., 2010)When hospitals use Kj and dj as sole instruments
the symmetric equilibrium is given by
Kdj =
mtD
2
+ tP   1
4
( + m) (2gP +mgD); (15)
ddj =  
mtD
2
+
1
4
m ( + m) gD: (16)
and hospitals realize a prot of
d =
mtD + tP
2
  ( + m) (gP +mgD)
4
:
Notice that ddj is exactly equal to mw
w
j =2. In other words, the total remuneration
received by providers T dj = d
d
j=m is half of the remuneration achieved in the salary game,
namely Twj = w
w
j . To understand why capitation payment leads to lower compensations,
let us start from the equilibrium salary ww. By denition, this salary level is such that no
hospital can gain by decreasing its salary given the salary o¤ered by the other platform.
Now, when the capitation payment level is the strategic variable, a decrease in a say
d1 induces (for a given level of d2) a reduction in compensation o¤ered by hospital 2
(because some providers move to hospital 2). This implies that a reduction in d1 (given
d2) is benecial, even though a reduction in w1 (given w2) is not. Interestingly, the price
level is also smaller with the capitation payment scheme. To see this, combine (15) and
(12) to obtain Kdj = K
w
j   (m=2)ww. Intuitively, we can once again start from the
equilibrium under salary schemes. By denition, hospital 1 cannot gain by decreasing
its price given K2 and w2. Under the capitation payment regime, a reduction in K1
brings about a reduction in the compensation (per provider) paid by hospital 2 (because
some patients move from hospital 2 to hospital 1). This in turn mitigates the negative
e¤ects of a decrease in the price and implies that a unilateral price decrease is benecial
when d2 is held constant even though it was not benecial when w2 was constant.
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The main features of the comparison between salary and capitation scheme are
summarized in the following proposition.18
Proposition 3 Comparing the equilibria achieved under salary and capitation pay-
ments shows that
i) ew = ed = 0: in both cases, doctors have no incentives to exert e¤ort (increase
the number of medical acts) and set e at its minimum level.
ii) T dj < T
w
j and K
d
j < K
w
j : patients pay a lower price and providers a lower
remuneration under a capitation payment than under a salary scheme.
iii) V d > V w and Ud < Uw for all z: all patients are better o¤ and all providers
worse o¤ under capitation then under wage schemes.
iv) wj = 
d
j : hospitalsprots are the same under both remuneration schemes.
The heath economics literature has extensively dealt with the relative merits of
payment schemes and specically their incentive properties. A point that is often made
is that at payment schemes (as opposed to fee-for-service schemes) have the advantage
of providing stronger incentives for cost reduction.19 Our results are in line with this
conventional wisdom albeit in a somewhat trivial way. Specically, we nd that both
payment schemes provide the same incentives to limit the number of medical acts as
much as possible. Finally, since a switch from salary to capitation scheme decreases
both patients pay and doctors remuneration, the impact on hospitals prots is a
priori ambiguous. In our specic setting the two e¤ects happen to cancel out exact so
that prots are the same under the two schemes; we simply have a transfer of rents from
providers to patients. This result is due to the assumption the market fully covered on
both sides which implies that hospitals compete in a business stealingmodel. When
the CNE is simply determined by the doctor/patient ratio, the term gP +mgD is equal
18 Items i), ii) and iv) follow directly from Propositions (1) and (2). Item iii) follows from i) and ii),
making use of (1) and (2), the specication of patientsand doctorsutilities.
19See, for instance, Gosden et al. (1999) for a review of the literature on the remuneration of health
care providers.
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to 0 and hospitals prots do not depend on the common network externalities (see
Bardey et al., 2010). This is because the negative externality generated by patients and
the positive one due to doctors exactly cancel each other out. In other words, their
prots are be the same as in a Hotelling game without network externalities.
5 Pure fee-for-service schemes
We now turn to the case where hospitals use a fee-for-service rate on the doctorsside,
while patients continue to pay a xed fee. The hospitals relevant rst-order conditions
are now equations (8) and (16). The symmetric equilibrium achieved in the case is
described in Proposition 4, which is established in Appendix B.
Proposition 4 When hospitals use Kj and cj as sole instruments the symmetric equi-
librium is described by
Kc1 = tP  
1
2
[( + 2m) gP   4mcc1] +
gPm
2cc1
;
(cc1)
2 =  2tD + 1
2
[( + 2m) gD + 4c
c
1] +

cc1

tD   mgD
2

;
and hospitals realize a prot of
c =
1
2

tP + 2mtD   1
2
[( + 2m) (gP +mgD)]  m
cc1

tD    (mgD + gP )
2

:
While we were able to obtain closed-form solutions under wage and capitation
schemes, this is no longer possible with a pure fee-for-service scheme. Accordingly,
the prices reported in Proposition 4 are implicitly dened as functions of cc1. This
makes their interpretation more di¢ cult. An observation that can easily be made at
this point is that hospitalsprots increase with the fee-for-service rate. However, this
is a relationship between two endogenous variables which has to be interpreted with
care.
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Closed form solutions continue to be available in the special case where  = 0. In
this situation, e can be interpreted as a pure induced demand e¤ect. Indeed, with c > 0
and  = 0, doctors exert a positive level of e¤ort (increasing the number of acts) to
increase their remuneration, but this does not induce any benets to patients. The
equilibrium in this case is stated in the following corollary, which follows directly from
Proposition 4.
Corollary 1 Assume  = 0. When hospitals use Kj and cj as sole instruments the
symmetric equilibrium is described by
Kc1 = tP  
1
2
( + 2m) gP ; (17)
(cc1)
2 =  2tD + 1
2
( + 2m) gD; (18)
and hospitals realize a prot of
c =
1
2

tP + 2mtD   1
2
[( + 2m) (gP +mgD)]

:
On the patientsside, as usual, the price charged depends positively on the trans-
portation cost tP . Moreover, the negative externality generated by patients increases
the price. Comparing Kc1 dened by (17) with K
w
1 specied by (12) shows that this
e¤ect is stronger when doctors are remunerated via a fee-for-service than under a salary
scheme. Consequently we have Kc1 ( = 0) > K
w
1 . Intuitively, the fee-for-service induces
a higher level of e, which increases the hospitalscost. This cost increase is shifted, at
least to some degree, to patients. In the same way, on the doctorsside, hospitals take
more advantage of the transportation cost tD when they use a fee-for-service scheme
due to the positive number of events. The positive externality generated by doctors
favor them in comparison with a salary payment. Moreover, it can be noticed that
we obtain a symmetric equilibrium that ensures a positive fee-for-service-rate only if
4tD  ( + 2m) gD. In words, the positive externality generated by doctors must be
high enough to outweigh the transportation cost that reduces their remuneration.
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We will now compare patientsand providerswelfare and hospitalsprots achieved
under fee-for-service and under the other remuneration schemes. We will concentrate on
the comparison with the salary regime. The comparisons will make use of the following
lemma which is established by substituting the equations provided in Propositions 1
and 4 into the denitions of V , U and  and by rearranging the resulting expressions.
Lemma 1 Welfare and prot variations between wage and fee-for-service regimes are
given by
V = V c   V w = mcc1  Kc1   (0 Kw1 ) = m

 cc1 +
1
2
gP

cc1   
cc1

; (19)
U = U c   Uw = (cc1)2

1  m
2
2

  ww1 (20)
=  mcc1

mcc1   4
2

 

tD   mgD
2

cc1   
cc1

; (21)
 = c  w = m
2

tD    (mgD + gP )
2

cc1   
cc1

: (22)
These expressions are rather complex. The only obvious result is that V < 0 for
 = 0. Intuitively, the fee-for-service increases the number of acts (we have e > 0). As
discussed above, this results in higher payments for patients but does not give them
any extra benets. The other expressions are ambiguous, even for  = 0. When tD 
mgD=2, we have U < 0, so that providers are also better o¤ with a salary scheme.
This is because they receive a higher payment and do not incur any disutility of e¤ort.
However, when tD > mgD=2 these two e¤ects go in opposite directions. Regarding ,
we have an explicit expressions for  = 0.20 Consequently, some results can be obtained
for that case. For instance, when the CNE is determined by the doctor/patient ratio
(a function homogeneous of degree 0, which implies mgD + gP = 0),  is necessarily
positive. It appears that hospitals take advantage of the fee-for-service to charge twice
the transportation cost on doctors, allowing them to increase their prot (compared to
salary or capitation scheme).
20The second factor on the RHS of (22) is then equal to 1.
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When  > 0, only few analytical results can be obtained. They make use of the
following Lemma (established in Appendix C) which studies the comparative statics
properties of cc1 and K
c
1 with respect to .
Lemma 2 The variations of cc1 and K
c
1 with respect to  satisfy the following properties.
i) In the neighborhood of  = 0 , mgD  2tD ensures that dcc1=d  1 which in turn
implies cc1  .
ii)
dKc1
d
= m

4c1 +

 2c1 + gP
2c1

(1  ")

;
where
" =

c1
dcc1
d
:
The variation of the total fee paid by patients with respect to  is ambiguous and
mainly depends on the elasticity of the fee-for-service rate with respect to . Situations
in which this elasticity is higher than 1 can be interpreted as an induced demand e¤ect.
In such a case, the fee-for-service rate paid to providers increases faster than the patients
valuation of the number of medical acts. Then, the xed price paid by patients increases
faster than their valuation of the number of events. On the contrary, for values of this
elasticity inferior to 1, we have two countervailing forces at work and the overall e¤ect
is ambiguous.
In the neighborhood of  = 0, we have cc1   which, from (19) implies V < 0
so that patients are worse o¤ when the doctors remuneration is switched from wage
to fee-for-service. Intuitively, the positive level of c implies that doctors exert some
e¤ort. However, the valuation of this e¤ort is low and it is more than outweighed by
the increase in the patientspayments.
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6 Mixed fee-for-service schemes
We now consider the case where the di¤erent types of remuneration can be combined
(on the doctorsside). First, we study a scheme involving both a salary and a fee-for-
service. Then, we consider a combination of capitation and fee-for-service. As to the
patients, we continue to consider only xed fees.
6.1 Fee-for-service and salary
The relevant rst-order conditions are now (8), (10) and (9). The resulting equilibrium
is stated in the following proposition, which is established in Appendix D.
Proposition 5 When hospitals use a xed fee Kj on the patientsside, while combining
wage wj and fee-for-service cj on the doctorsside,
(i) the symmetric equilibrium is given by
Kwc1 = tP  
1
2
( +m) gP + 2m
2; (23)
wwc1 =  tD + gD
1
2
( +m) + 2; (24)
cwc1 = ; (25)
and hospitals realize a prot of
wc = w = d =
1
2

tP +mtD   1
2
( +m) (gP +mgD)

: (26)
(ii) the induced e¤ort level ej = m is e¢ cient (maximizes total surplus).
Interestingly, the mixed payment case turns out to be simpler to solve than the
pure fee-for-service case and we obtain closed form solutions like in Section 4. The
proposition shows that the introduction of a fee-for-service (on top of the salary) only
makes a di¤erence when  > 0, i.e., when e¤ort (number of acts) is valued positively
by patients. For  = 0, the extra instrument is not used in equilibrium and both the
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patientsbill as well as the wage remain at the same levels as under a pure wage scheme
(we have Kwc1 = K
w
1 and w
wc
1 = w
w
1 ). Now, when  > 0, hospitals use a positive
fee-for-service in equilibrium, and it is just equal to  (the marginal benet to patients).
The shifting pattern of this extra fee is quite interesting. One could have expected
some kind of crowding out (or substitution) between remuneration schemes, but we nd
exactly the opposite result: salary but also prices increase such that patients loose and
doctors win. This result only comes from the role played by the number of consultation
and does not interact with the quality captured by the common network externalities.
To understand this, consider a slightly di¤erent game in which the fee-for-service rate is
exogenously set at its e¢ cient level c1 = c2 = , while the number of consultations per
patient is xed and given by e = m (the level of e¤ort implied by (3) when c1 = c2 = 
and when nP1 = n
D
1 = 1=2).
21 In this game, when hospitals compete in price and salary
as in Section 4, it can easily be shown that, symmetric equilibrium, prices and salaries
are equal toKw1 +m
2 and ww1 respectively (whereK
w
1 and w
w
1 are dened by expressions
(12) and (13) in Proposition 1. Now, let us continue to assume that the fee-for-service is
given by c1 = c2 = , but that the number of consultations per patient is determined by
(3) which depends on the number of patients and doctors e¤ectively a¢ liated with both
hospitals. Further assume that prices and wages in hospital 2 are given by Kw2 +m
2
and ww2 respectively.
22 An increase in the price or the wage in hospital 1 now brings
21 In this game, the demand functions for hospital 1 are given by
nP1 =
1
2
+
1
2tP

g

nP1 ; n
D
1

  [K1  K2]

;
nD1 =
1
2
+
1
2tD

g

nP1 ; n
D
1

+ [w1   w2]

:
22The demand system for hospital 1 becomes
nP1 =
1
2
+
1
2tP
 
g

nP1 ; n
D
1

+ 2
 
mnD1
nP1
  m
 
1  nD1

1  nP1
!
  (K1  K2)
!
;
nD1 =
1
2
+
1
2tD

+g

nP1 ; n
D
1

+ [w1   w2]

:
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about an increase in the number of consultations per patient in hospital 1 (because
some patients move from hospital 1 to hospital 2; while doctors move from hospital 2
to hospital 1). This in turn mitigates the negative e¤ects of an increase in the price and
the wage and implies that a unilateral price and wage increase is benecial when w2;K2
and c2 are held constant. This leads to higher symmetric equilibrium prices and wages
which, as shown by (23) and (24) are given by Kw1 + 2m
2 and ww1 + m
2. To sum
up, the introduction of the fee-for-service component along with a salary scheme leads
to higher prices on the patientsside and higher wages on doctorsside. Observe, that
this has no adverse e¤ect on hospitalsprots; the extra compensation paid to doctors
is exactly shifted to patients. A patients bill increase by 2m2, which is equal to the
sum of the fee-for-service (mcwc1  = m
2) and the extra salary (m2).23
Welfare comparisons are also much simpler than in the pure fee-for-service case.
With the closed form solutions reported in Propositions 1 and 5, it is straightforward
to compare patientsand doctorswelfare.
Proposition 6 When a fee-for-service component is introduced into a pure salary scheme,
the welfare variations are:
i) on the patientsside, V = V wc   V w =  m2 < 0;
ii) on the doctorsside, U = Uwc   Uw = (3=2) 2 > 0.
To sum-up, patients loose, doctors win and (as shown by 26) hospitals are indi¤erent.
Patients do benet from the increase in e (which they value when  > 0), but this benet
is more than o¤set by the increase in fees.
6.2 Fee-for-service and capitation payment
The relevant rst-order conditions are now (8), (10) and (11). The solution is derived
in Appendix E, and presented in the following proposition.
23The m appears in the expressions because there are m doctors per patient in a symmetric equilib-
rium.
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Proposition 7 When hospitals use a xed fee Kj as the sole instruments on the pa-
tientsside, while capitation payment dj and fee-for-service cj on the doctorsside,
(i) the symmetric equilibrium is given by
ddc1 =  
1
2
mtD + (m+ )
mgD
4
+
1
2
m2;
Kdc1 = tP +
1
2
mtD   ( +m) (2gP +mgD)
4
+
3
2
m2;
cdc1 = ;
and hospitals realize a prot of
dc = wc = w = d =
1
2

tP +mtD   1
2
( +m) (gP +mgD)

;
(ii) the induced e¤ort level ej = m is e¢ cient (maximizes total surplus).
As in the previous case, for  = 0, at a symmetric equilibrium hospitals do not use
a fee-for-service rate and consequently we obtain exactly the same equilibrium as the
one obtained in a pure capitation payment on doctorsside. Now, when  > 0, the xed
price paid by patients is increased. This rent paid by patients is totally transferred to
doctors as hospitalsprot remain the same as in the previous cases (except the case
when hospitals only remunerate providers via a fee-for-service scheme). The intuition
is exactly the same as when the fee-for-service was combined with the salary. As in
that previous setting, there is no crowding out between remuneration schemes, i.e., the
capitation payment received by doctors increases simultaneously with the fee-for-service
rate. As in the previous section, prices are wages are increased because the number of
consultations per patient is increasing in the number of doctors and decreasing in the
number of patients.
Proposition 8 When a fee-for-service component is introduced in a pure capitation
payment scheme, the welfare variations are:
i) on the patientsside, V = V dc   V d =  m2= < 0;
ii) on the providersside, U = Udc   Ud = 2 > 0.
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The introduction of a fee-for-service component in a capitation payment scheme un-
ambiguously decreases the patientswelfare and increases the doctorsutility. As in the
previous case i.e. in the salary case, the fee-for-service introduction favors doctors while
patients are worse o¤. However, the capitation scheme remains more patient friendly
exactly like under pure (salary of capitation) remuneration schemes; see Proposition 3.
7 Numerical illustration
We now provide a numerical example which illustrates our analytical results and pro-
vides a basis of comparisons for the cases where analytical results are ambiguous. Table
1 reports the results for the following example: '

NCj ; N
P
j

=

NCj =N
P
j

, tP = 4 ;
tD = 1,  = 2,  = 1, m = 0:3; V = 10 and U = 0. We consider di¤erent levels of 
including 0 (the case for which we have a full set of analytical results). This uses the
simplest meaningful specication for quality by assuming that the CNE depends on the
patient-doctor ratio.
For the most part this example simply illustrates the earlier results and there is no
point reviewing them here. However, there are some extra features which supplement
the analytical results. First, we nd that a fee-for-service is bad for patientswelfare,
even for levels of  beyond the neighborhood of  = 0. As  increases, patients put a
higher value on the doctorse¤ort and only a fee-for-service can induce this e¤ort. This
e¤ect tends to make the fee-for-service remuneration attractive to patients. However,
this comes at a price. As competition for doctors intensies, their total compensation
increases in a signicant way and this extra cost is more then fully shifted to the patients.
Overall, it turns out that the increase in fees more then outweighs the benets patients
derive from the higher e¤ort.
Turning to the mixed schemes, we know from the analytical part that patientswel-
fare decreases as a fee-for-service element is introduced along with a salary or capitation
payment. The numerical example also shows what happens when a wage element is in-
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 = 0  = 0:5  = 1  = 2
Tw 3:6 3:6 3:6 3:6
T d 1:8 1:8 1:8 1:8
T c 3:2 5:66 9:49 22:22
Twc 3:6 4:1 5:6 11:6
T dc 1:8 2:15 3:21 7:44
Kw 5:38 5:38 5:38 5:38
Kd 4:84 4:84 4:84 4:84
Kc 5:56 6:23 7:35 11:14
Kwc 5:38 5:53 5:98 7:78
Kdc 4:84 4:95 5:29 6:64
c 2:30 2:26 2:25 2:23
w = c = wc = dc 2:15 2:15 2:15 2:15
V w 4:62 4:62 4:62 4:62
V d 5:16 5:16 5:16 5:16
V c 4:44 4:13 3:58 1:69
V wc 4:62 4:55 4:32 3:42
V dc 5:16 5:13 5:01 4:56
Uw 3:6 3:6 3:6 3:6
Ud 1:8 1:8 1:8 1:8
U c 3:05 5:40 9:06 21:22
Uwc 3:6 4:08 5:55 11:42
Udc 1:8 2:16 3:25 7:62
Table 1: Equilibrium under di¤erent remuneration schemes when '(NPj ; N
D
j ) =
(NPj =N
D
j ), tP = 4; tD = 1,  = 2,  = 1, m = 0:3; V = 10, U = 0 for di¤erent
levels of .
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troduced in a fee-for-service scheme. For the considered parameter values, this leads to
an increase in patientswelfare. More interestingly, it has an ambiguous e¤ect on doc-
torswelfare. It increases when  is small, but decreases for larger levels of . In other
words, when  is su¢ ciently large, doctors would prefer a pure fee-for-service scheme.
8 Conclusion
This paper represents an attempt to study the interplay between hospitalscompetition
and doctors remuneration schemes properties via a two-sided market approach that
includes common network externalities. In a rst step, we consider pure wage, capitation
of fee-for-service payment schemes. We nd that the number of consultations, and
consequently the level of quality delivered, is higher under a fee-for-service scheme than
under other schemes. As a matter of fact, when doctors are remunerated solely via a
salary or a capitation payment, they provide the minimum level of e¤ort. Under salary
and capitation schemes, hospitals obtain the same prot at equilibrium. Patients pay
a lower price and doctors are less remunerated when they receive capitation payments
rather than salary schemes are used. In other words, a capitation payment scheme
favor patients while patients are better o¤ under a salary scheme. Next, even though
our set-up can be considered as biased in favor of fee-for-service schemes, our results
suggest that patients are worse o¤ when doctors are paid via a fee-for-service rather
than under a salary scheme. We show this analytically for the case when the number
of acts provides only small benets to patients. For larger levels of benets, numerical
simulations appear to corroborate this result.
Second, we consider payment schemes mixing fee-for-service with either salary or
capitation payments. We show that in either case, hospitals set the fee-for-service rate
just equal to the patientsvaluation of the number of consultations. Both type of mixed
schemes yield the same prot for hospitals as under pure capitation fee or salary schemes.
Moreover, the two mixed schemes imply the same overall welfare even though they di¤er
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in their implications for patients and doctors. Exactly like in the pure remuneration
case, the presence of a capitation element favors patients, while a salary term favors
doctors. Finally, our results show that the introduction of a fee-for-service component
in a capitation or salary scheme always favor doctors whereas patients are worse o¤, in
spite of the quality increase.
This paper can be extended in several directions. First, it would be interesting to
consider outcome where the market for patients is not completely covered. From a
theoretical perspective this would actually simplify the model. However, it would make
it more interesting from an applied policy perspective as access to health care is a major
problem in practice. Second, both from a theoretical and from a practical perspective,
it would be useful to study mixed oligopolies (with public or non prot hospitals).
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Appendix
A Properties of the demand functions
Di¤erentiating (4) and (5), rearranging and solving yields
dnP1
dK1
=
 1
4tDtP jBj

2tD  

mgD   4
m
d1

;
dnD1
dK1
=
 1
4tDtP jBj

gP +
4
m
d1

;
dnP1
dw1
=
1
4tDtP jBj [m [gD + 4c1]] ;
dnD1
dw1
=
1
4tDtP jBj [2tP   (gP   4mc1)] ;
dnP1
dc1
=
m
4tP tD jBj



2tD  

mgD   4

d1
m
+ c21

+ c1gD

;
dnD1
dc1
=
1
4tP tD jBj

(2tP   [gP   4mc1]) c1 +

gP +
4
m
d1

m

;
dnP1
dd1
=
1
4tDtP jBj [gD + 4c1] =
1
m
dnP1
dw1
;
dnD1
dd1
=
1
4mtDtP jBj [2tP   (gP   4mc1)] =
1
m
dnD1
dw1
;
where
jBj = 1
4tP tD

4tP tD   2tP mgD   gP 2tD + 4
m
d1 (2tP    (gP +mgD))
+4mc1 [2tD    (mgD + gP )]] :
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B Proof of Proposition 4
The demand functions properties are in this case:
dnP1
dK1
=
 1
4tDtP jBj [(2tD   mgD)] ;
dnD1
dK1
=
 1
4tDtP jBj [gP ] ;
dnP1
dc1
=
m
4tP tD jBj
h


2tD  

mgD   4 (c1)2

+ c1gD
i
;
dnD1
dc1
=
1
4tP tD jBj [(2tP   [gP   4mc1]) c1 + gPm] ;
where
jBj = 1
4tP tD
[4tP tD   2tP mgD   gP 2tD + 4mc1 [2tD    (mgD + gP )]] :
The rst-order conditions reduce to
@1
@K1
=
1
2
+
@nP1
@K1
K1  mc21
@nD1
@K1
= 0;
@1
@c1
=
@nP1
@c1
K1  mc21
@nD1
@c1
 mc1 = 0:
From (8) and (10), we have
1
2
+
@nP1
@K1
K1

@nD1
@c1
=
@nD1
@K1

@nP1
@c1
K1  mc1

or,
K1 =
@nD1
@c1
+ 2mc1
@nD1
@K1
2

@nD1
@K1
@nP1
@c1
  @nP1@K1
@nD1
@c1
 :
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The denominator can be succesively rearranged as follows
2

@nD1
@K1
@nP1
@c1
  @n
P
1
@K1
@nD1
@c1

= 2
  1
4tDtP jBj [mgP ]
1
4tP tD jBj
h


2tD  

mgD   4 (c1)2

+ c1gD
i
+
1
4tDtP jBj [(2tD   mgD)]
1
4tP tD jBj [(2tP   [gP   4mc1]) c1 + gPm]

=
2c1
(4tDtP jBj)2
( 4 (c1)mgP + 2tD2tP   2tDgP   mgD2tP
+4mc1 (2tD)  mgD4mc1)
=
2c1
(4tP tD jBj) :
Consequently, we obtain
K1 =
(2tP   [( + 2m) gP   4mc1]) c1 + gPm
2c1
;
= tP   1
2
[( + 2m) gP   4mc1] + gPm
2c1
:
Moreover, we have
1
2 +
@nP1
@K1
K1
@nD1
@K1
= mc21;
leading to
1
2
(4tP tD   2tP mgD   gP 2tD + 4mc1 [2tD    (mgD + gP )])
  [2tD   mgD]

tP   1
2
( + 2m) gP + 2mc1 +
gPm
2c1

=  gPmc21;
implying
c21 = 2c1   2tD +
gD
2
( + 2m) +

c1

tD   mgD
2

:
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Finally, evaluating hospitalsprots at this equilibrium yields
c =
1
2

tP   1
2
[( + 2m) gP   4mc1] + gPm
2c1
 m

2c1 +

 2tD   tD 
c1
+
gD
2
[( + 2m)]  gD m
2c1

;
=
1
2

tP + 2mtD   1
2
[( + 2m) (gP +mgD)] +
m
c1

tD    (gP +mgD)
2

:
C Proof of Lemma 2
Prices in a symmetric equilibrium are given by:
K1 = tP  
1
2
[( + 2m) gP   4mc1] + gPm
2c1
;
(c1 )
2 =  2tD + 1
2
[( + 2m) gD + 4c1] +

c1

tD   mgD
2

:
Di¤erentiation with respect to  gives:0@ 1  2m + gPm2c21
0 2 (c1   ) + c21

tD   mgD2
 1A dK1
dc1

=  
  2mc1   mgP2c1
 2c1   1c1

tD   mgD2
 ! d
So, the Cramers rule gives:
dc1
d
=
1
jj
 1 2mc1 +
mgP
2c1
0 2c1 +
1
c1

tD   mgD2
  ;
=
1
jj

2c1 +
1
c1

tD   mgD
2

;
with
jj = 2 (c1   ) + 
c21

tD   mgD
2

:
31
Moreover, we have
dK1
d
=
1
jj

2mc1 +
mgP
2c1
 2m + gPm
2c21
2c1 +
1
c1

tD   mgD2

2 (c1   ) + c21

tD   mgD2
  ;
=
1
jj

2mc1 +
mgP
2c1

2 (c1   ) + 
c21

tD   mgD
2

 

2c1 +
1
c1

tD   mgD
2

 2m + gPm
2c21

;
= 2mc1 +
mgP
2c1
  dc1
d

 2m + gPm
2c21

;
= m

2c1 +
gP
2c1
  
c1
dc1
d

 2c1 + gP
2c1

;
= m

4c1 +

 2c1 + gP
2c1

(1  )

;
with
 =

c1
dc1
d
:
Finally, we have
dc1
d
 1
,
2c1   1
c1

tD   mgD
2

 2 (c1   )  
c21

tD   mgD
2

:
A su¢ cient condition to ensure this last inequality is mgD  2tD.
D Proof of Proposition 5
@1
@K1
=
1
2
+
@nP1
@K1
K1  m

c21 + w1
 @nD1
@K1
= 0;
@1
@c1
=
@nP1
@c1
K1  m

c21 + w1
 @nD1
@c1
 mc1 = 0;
@1
@w1
= K1
@nP1
@w1
  m
2
 m c21 + w1 @nD1@w1 = 0:
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From (8) and (10), we have respectively that
1
2 +
@nP1
@K1
K1
@nD1
@K1
= m

c21 + w1

and,
@nP1
@c1
K1  mc1
@nD1
@c1
= m

c21 + w1

:
It gives 
1
2
+
@nP1
@K1
K1

@nD1
@c1
=

@nP1
@c1
K1  mc1

@nD1
@K1
or,
K1 =
@nD1
@c1
+ 2mc1
@nD1
@K1
2

@nP1
@c1
@nD1
@K1
  @nP1@K1
@nD1
@c1
 :
From (8) and (9), we have respectively that
1
2 +
@nP1
@K1
K1
@nD1
@K1
= m

c21 + w1

and,
K1
@nP1
@w1
  m2
@nD1
@w1
= m

c21 + w1

:
It gives that 
1
2
+
@nP1
@K1
K1

@nD1
@w1
=
@nD1
@K1

K1
@nP1
@w1
  m
2

or,
K1 =
@nD1
@w1
+m
@nD1
@K1
2

@nD1
@K1
@nP1
@w1
  @nP1@K1
@nD1
@w1
 :
Combining with (D) yields
@nD1
@c1
+ 2mc1
@nD1
@K1
2

@nP1
@c1
@nD1
@K1
  @nP1@K1
@nD1
@c1
 = @nD1@w1 +m@nD1@K1
2

@nD1
@K1
@nP1
@w1
  @nP1@K1
@nD1
@w1

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or, 
@nD1
@c1
+ 2mc1
@nD1
@K1

@nD1
@K1
@nP1
@w1
  @n
P
1
@K1
@nD1
@w1

=

@nD1
@w1
+m
@nD1
@K1

@nP1
@c1
@nD1
@K1
  @n
P
1
@K1
@nD1
@c1

:
It gives
2mc1 =

@nD1
@w1
+m
@nD1
@K1
 h
@nP1
@c1
@nD1
@K1
  @nP1@K1
@nD1
@c1
i
  @nD1@c1

@nD1
@K1
@nP1
@w1
  @nP1@K1
@nD1
@w1


@nD1
@K1
@nP1
@w1
  @nP1@K1
@nD1
@w1

@nD1
@K1
;
implying that
2mc1 =

@nD1
@w1
+m
@nD1
@K1
 h
@nP1
@c1
@nD1
@K1
  @nP1@K1
@nD1
@c1
i
  @nD1@c1
h
@nD1
@K1
@nP1
@w1
  @nP1@K1
@nD1
@w1
i

@nD1
@K1
@nP1
@w1
  @nP1@K1
@nD1
@w1

@nD1
@K1
=
@nP1
@c1

@nD1
@w1
+m
@nD1
@K1

  @nD1@c1

m
@nP1
@K1
+
@nP1
@w1

@nD1
@K1
@nP1
@w1
  @nP1@K1
@nD1
@w1
:
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The numerator gives
@nP1
@c1

@nD1
@w1
+m
@nD1
@K1

  @n
D
1
@c1

m
@nP1
@K1
+
@nP1
@w1

=
m
(4tDtP jBj)2

2tD   mgD + 4c21 + c1gD

[2tP   ( + m) gP + 4mc1]
+
 2tP c1 + gP c1   4mc21   gPm [ 2tD + ( + m) gD + 4c1]
=
m
(4tDtP jBj)2
(4tP tD   2tD ( + m) gP + 2tD4mc1   mgD2tP
+mgD ( + m) gP   mgD4mc1
+4 (c1)
2 2tP   4 (c1)2 ( + m) gP + 4 (c1)2 4mc1
+c1gD2tP   c1gD ( + m) gP + c1gD4mc1
+4tP tDc1   2tP c1 ( + m) gD   2tP c14c1
 gP c12tD + gP c1 ( + m) gD + gP c14c1
+4mc212tD   4mc21 ( + m) gD   4mc214c1
+gPm2tD   gPm ( + m) gD   gPm4c1) ;
=
m
(4tDtP jBj)2
 
( + c1) [4tP tD   2tDgP   mgD2tP + 4mc1 (2tD    (mgD + gP ))]

;
=
m ( + c1)
(4tDtP jBj) :
Therefore, we obtain
2mc1 =
@nP1
@c1
h
@nD1
@w1
+m
@nD1
@K1
i
  @nD1@c1
h
m
@nP1
@K1
+
@nP1
@w1
i
@nD1
@K1
@nP1
@w1
  @nP1@K1
@nD1
@w1
;
= m ( + c1) :
Then, we have
c1 = :
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Moreover, patientsprice becomes
K1 =
@nD1
@w1
+m
@nD1
@K1
2

@nD1
@K1
@nP1
@w1
  @nP1@K1
@nD1
@w1
 ;
=
2tP   (gP   4mc1) mgP
2
;
= tP   1
2
( +m) gP + 2mc1;
= tP   1
2
( +m) gP + 2m
2:
The salary is determined by
mw1 =
1
2 +
@nP1
@K1
K1
@nD1
@K1
 mc21;
=
1
 gP (2tDtP   tDgP   tP mgD + 2mc1 (2tD    (mgD + gP ))
  [2tD   mgD]

tP   1
2
( +m) gP + 2m
2

 m2:
Therefore, we obtain
w1 =  tD + gD
2
( +m) + 2:
Hospitalsprot becomes:
1 =
1
2
h
K^1  m
h
(c^1)
2 + w^1
ii
;
=
1
2

tP   1
2
( +m) gP + 2m
2  m
h
2   tD + gD
2
( +m) + 2
i
;
=
1
2

tP +mtD   1
2
( +m) (gP +mgD)

:
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E Proof of Proposition 7
From the set of relevant rst order conditions, we have:
1
2
+
@nP1
@K1
[K1   d1] = mc21
@nD1
@K1
;
@nP1
@c1
[K1   d1] mc1 = mc21
@nD1
@c1
;
 1
2
+
dnP1
dd1
[K1   d1] = mc21
dnD1
dd1
:
It gives
1
2 +
@nP1
@K1
[K1   d1]
@nD1
@K1
= mc21
and,
 12 +
dnP1
dd1
[K1   d1]
dnD1
dd1
= mc21;
therefore, we have
1
2
+
@nP1
@K1
[K1   d1]

dnD1
dd1
=
@nD1
@K1

 1
2
+
dnP1
dd1
[K1   d1]

or,
K1   d1 =
dnD1
dd1
+
@nD1
@K1
2

@nD1
@K1
dnP1
dd1
  @nP1@K1
dnD1
dd1
 :
Moreover, we have
@nP1
@c1
[K1   d1] mc1
@nD1
@c1
= mc21:
It gives that 
@nP1
@c1
[K1   d1] mc1

@nD1
@K1
=
@nD1
@c1

1
2
+
@nP1
@K1
[K1   d1]

or,
K1   d1 =
@nD1
@c1
+ 2mc1
@nD1
@K1
2

@nP1
@c1
@nD1
@K1
  @nD1@c1
@nP1
@K1
 :
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Then, we have
dnD1
dd1
+
@nD1
@K1
@nD1
@K1
dnP1
dd1
  @nP1@K1
dnD1
dd1
 = @nD1@c1 + 2mc1 @nD1@K1
@nP1
@c1
@nD1
@K1
  @nD1@c1
@nP1
@K1

or, 
dnD1
dd1
+
@nD1
@K1

@nP1
@c1
@nD1
@K1
  @n
D
1
@c1
@nP1
@K1

=

@nD1
@c1
+ 2mc1
@nD1
@K1

@nD1
@K1
dnP1
dd1
  @n
P
1
@K1
dnD1
dd1

:
It can also be written
2mc1 =
h
dnD1
dd1
+
@nD1
@K1
i 
@nP1
@c1
@nD1
@K1
  @nD1@c1
@nP1
@K1

  @nD1@c1

@nD1
@K1
dnP1
dd1
  @nP1@K1
dnD1
dd1

@nD1
@K1

@nD1
@K1
dnP1
dd1
  @nP1@K1
dnD1
dd1

or,
2mc1 =
@nP1
@c1
h
dnD1
dd1
+
@nD1
@K1
i
  @nD1@c1
h
@nP1
@K1
+
dnP1
dd1
i

@nD1
@K1
dnP1
dd1
  @nP1@K1
dnD1
dd1
 :
Let us now simplify the denominator. We have
@nD1
@K1
dnP1
dd1
  @n
P
1
@K1
dnD1
dd1
=
 1
4tDtP jBj

gP +
4
m
d1

1
4tDtP jBj [gD + 4c1]
+
1
4tDtP jBj

2tD  

mgD   4
m
d1

1
4mtDtP jBj [2tP   (gP   4mc1)] ;
=
1
m (4tDtP jBj) :
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The numerator gives:
@nP1
@c1

dnD1
dd1
+
@nD1
@K1

  @n
D
1
@c1

@nP1
@K1
+
dnP1
dd1

=
1
(4tP tD jBj)2

2tD   mgD + 4d1
m
+ 4 (c1)
2 + c1gD

(2tP   gP + 4mc1   mgP   4d1)
+
 
2tP c1   gP c1 + 4mc21 + mgP + 4d1

2tD   (m+ ) gD + 4
m
d1   4c1

;
=
( + c1)
(4tP tD jBj)2
(4tP tD   2tDgP   mgD2tP + 4mc1 (2tD    (mgD + gP ))
+
4
m
d1 (2tP    (gP +mgD))

;
=
( + c1)
(4tP tD jBj) :
Therefore, we have
2mc1 =
@nP1
@c1
h
dnD1
dd1
+
@nD1
@K1
i
  @nD1@c1
h
@nP1
@K1
+
dnP1
dd1
i

@nD1
@K1
dnP1
dd1
  @nP1@K1
dnD1
dd1
 ;
implying that c1 = .
According to that
@nP1
@c1
@nD1
@K1
  @n
D
1
@c1
@nP1
@K1
=
1
4tP tD jBj

2tD   mgD + 4

d1
m
+ (c1)
2

+ c1gD
  1
4tDtP jBj [mgP + 4d1]
+
1
4tP tD jBj

(2tP   [gP   4mc1]) c1 +

gP +
4
m
d1

m

1
4tDtP jBj

2tD   mgD + 4
m
d1

;
=
c1
(4tP tD jBj)2
[2tP 2tD   2tDgP   2tP mgD + 4mc1 (2tD    (mgD + gP ))
+
4
m
d1 (2tP    (gP +mgD))

;
we have
K1   d1 =
dnD1
dd1
+
@nD1
@K1
2

@nD1
@K1
dnP1
dd1
  @nP1@K1
dnD1
dd1
 ;
= tP   ( +m) gP
2
+ 2mc1   2d1:
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Moreover, combining (8) and (11), we have
@nP1
@K1
+
dnP1
dd1

[K1   d1] = mc21

@nD1
@K1
+
dnD1
dd1

or, 
 

2tD  

mgD   4
m
d1

+ gD + 4c1

[K1   d1]
= mc21

 

gP +
4
m
d1

+
1
m
(2tP   (gP   4mc1))

:
Therefore, we obtain that
~d1 =  1
2
mtD + (m+ )
mgD
4
+m2
and,
~K1 = tP +
1
2
mtD   ( +m) (2gP +mgD)
4
  1
2
m2:
At a symmetric equilibrium, hospitalsprot are:
~1 =
1
2
h
~K1   ~d1  mc21
i
=
1
2

tP   ( +m) gP
2
+ 2mc1
 2

 1
2
mtD + (m+ )
mgD
4
+m2

1  1
2
m

 m2

;
=
1
2

tP +mtD   ( +m) (gP +mgD)
2

= 1 = 

1 :
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